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Abstract 
The EC-Seals case stemmed from complaints by Canada and Norway against European Union 
regulations that effectively banned the importation and marketing of seal products from those 
countries. The EU said it had responded to European moral outrage at the killing of seals. Canada and 
Norway challenged the regime under various provisions of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
Agreement and the GATT. This analysis looks primarily at the WTO panel decision and considers 
issues such as whether there is any bright line to be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate 
purposes in regulation and the proper legal meaning of a “technical regulation.”  
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I. Introduction 
European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products1 
involved complaints by Canada and Norway against European Union regulations that had the effect of 
banning the importation and marketing of seal products in the EU. The EU said it enacted the ban in 
response to European moral outrage at the inhumane killing of seals, and to avoid participation in such 
inhumane killing by the purchase of seal products. The EU claimed a general ban was necessary, as 
opposed to a ban solely on products from seals killed inhumanely, because it would be impossible to 
monitor effectively whether particular seals were killed inhumanely on seal hunts. Three categories of 
seal products were excepted from the ban: products from seals killed in traditional hunts by members 
of indigenous communities such as the Inuit (the “IC exception”); products from seals killed in hunts 
authorized by national governments for marine resources management (the “MRM exception”); and 
products brought in by travelers for their own use (the “Travelers’ Exception”).  
Canada and Norway challenged the EU seal products regime under various provisions of the 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement and the GATT. Aside from the threshold TBT issue of 
whether the regime was a technical regulation, the principal issues under both agreements revolved 
around whether the EU’s various purposes were legitimate, whether they were evenhandedly applied, 
and whether the general ban on seal products was unnecessarily trade-restrictive. The Panel found that 
the measure was a technical regulation within the meaning of TBT Annex 1.1, and that both the IC 
exception and the MRM exception violated TBT 2.1. The Panel also found a violation of TBT 5.1.2, 
first sentence, as well as violations of GATT I:1 (the IC exception) and III:4 (the MRM exception). 
The Appellate Body has already decided the appeals from the Panel’s decision.2 The Appellate Body 
found that the measure was not shown to be a technical regulation, and declared the Panel’s discussion 
of particular TBT violations “moot and of no legal effect”. The Appellate Body then confirmed the 
GATT I:1 violation, although on somewhat different reasoning from the Panel. (The EU did not 
appeal the Panel’s finding of a III:4 violation.)  
This essay comprises two principal sections, section II on economic considerations, and section III 
on the legal issues. Of course, it is the premise of this entire series of case reports that there is 
no essential conflict between the economic and legal perspectives, and that a unified presentation 
should be possible in principle. Both co-authors accept that premise. But regardless of disciplinary 
background, people can disagree about how tribunals should approach cases such as EC – Seal 
Products, about the relative dangers of protectionism and undue restriction of legitimate 
regulation; and we have not achieved sufficient agreement between ourselves to allow a unified 
presentation. So by default, each author has tended to his own disciplinary last, with input from the 
other. 
Section II attempts to describe a general framework for thinking about conflicts between the right 
to regulate and rights of market access. One of the most interesting aspects of the case is the extent to 
which the EU concern was based on the sentiments of its citizenry about economic activity occurring 
in other countries. Section II considers different economic approaches to consumer welfare and asks 
whether there are any bright lines that can be drawn between different justifications for regulation. 
Section II also considers how we might use the economic theory of screening equilibria in trying to 
identify regulations motivated by illegitimate national-origin preferences. Finally, section II takes up 
the economic theory of incomplete contracting and time-inconsistency, to discuss the effect on trade 
negotiations of uncertainty about how treaty language will be interpreted by dispute settlement 
tribunals; and it asks whether there are lessons for the treaty interpreter. 
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Section III, on the legal issues, faces a special problem, which also turns out to be an opportunity. 
The general plan of this series of case discussions requires that we should discuss the Panel report, and 
leave the Appellate Body report for discussion next year. That seems quixotic enough. In addition, the 
Panel’s main focus was on the TBT; its treatment of the GATT issues was parasitic on its TBT 
analysis. But as noted above, the Appellate Body found that the measure was not shown to be a 
technical regulation (reversing the Panel on that), and declared the Panel’s discussion of particular 
TBT violations “moot and of no legal effect”. In section III we will discuss the TBT issues (and only 
the TBT issues) at both the Panel and Appellate Body levels. We will discuss both the Panel’s analysis 
and the Appellate Body’s analysis of whether the EU seal products regime is a technical regulation; 
and we will then discuss the Panel’s analysis of the other TBT issues (which the Appellate Body does 
not address). Even though the Panel’s TBT analysis has no legal effect, it is nonetheless the first 
discussion we have by a WTO tribunal of important TBT issues that will certainly arise again. We will 
not discuss the GATT issues at either the Panel or Appellate Body level. The Panel’s GATT analysis 
has not been declared moot across the board, but it has been largely superseded by the Appellate 
Body’s treatment, which we leave for discussion next year.  
II. Economic Considerations 
From an economic standpoint, the most interesting facets of the case include the plausible scope of 
individual and societal preferences, screening equilibria, and incomplete contracting. The case 
revolved around the EU contention that the sale of seal products within the European market would 
pose a threat to European morals. Curiously, throughout the argumentation, there was relatively little 
dispute about this assertion. There were disputes aplenty, to be sure, but they tended to revolve around 
which line of legal reasoning would arrive at this conclusion and, in turn, what requirements the 
ultimate legal approach would impose on the EU’s devotion to its cause and the actions the EU would 
take.  
In a prescient analysis from 1997,
3
 Charnovitz discussed the concept of morality in international 
trade law. He noted that clauses in trade agreements had made allowances for measures in support of 
public morals from the 1920s and earlier. The explicit GATT provision, Article XX(a), thus had a long 
provenance, but had yet to be explored or fleshed out through dispute settlement.
4
 The EC-Seals case 
marks at least the opening round of that exploration.  
In the dispute, the question of whether the EU Seal Regime denied Canada and Norway their rights 
under TBT or under GATT took center stage. Here, though, we shunt it aside and focus instead on 
how one might think the case in terms of some of the first principles of economics, such as preferences 
and consumption. That leads to some more subtle topics, such as imperfect information and 
bargaining. In deliberate contrast to a legal approach, we consider these matters afresh, without 
worrying about precedents or judicial interpretations. The goal is to make a connection between 
conceptual approaches and likely outcomes. Particularly on a topic that is being freshly litigated, the 
hope is that this approach will provide, if not a guide, at least a yardstick against which the legally-
mandated approaches can be measured.  
A core question in the EC-Seals case is the extent and character of EU concerns over Canadian and 
Norwegian seal hunts. Section II.A. asks whether there are natural bright lines that separate the 
legitimate topics of national concern from illegitimate topics. For that section, we stipulate purity of 
motive on the part of the EU. Section II.B. relaxes the purity assumption and considers the quest for a 
separating equilibrium which might distinguish the purely motivated from the impurely motivated. 
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Section II.C. sets aside questions of the legitimacy of motivation and steps back from the particular 
questions of seals and morality to ask what happens if we observe shifts in the scope of rights and 
obligations over time.  
II.A. Bright Lines and Hakapiks  
A.1 Introduction 
What are the proper bounds of a country’s regulatory powers? If countries are allowed to lay out the 
permissible characteristics of a product, what do we mean by “characteristics”? As a means of 
addressing these questions, this section establishes a basic framework that we will later complicate. 
Throughout this section, we assume that there is homogeneity of preferences among a national 
population. In economic parlance, one could discuss a representative agent with utility U(•), where all 
of the debate will be over the implications of placing ever-broader arguments in the utility function. In 
political terms, we will assume that these individuals have an actual representative agent (government) 
with no motive other than to maximize the population’s well-being (the discounted stream of utility 
payoffs over time).  
We progress from narrow, uncontroversial determinants of well-being to broader, more arguable 
ones. At each stage, we stop to take note of the measurability of the product characteristics in question, 
any natural limitations on the scope of individuals’ concerns, and on the potential for international 
conflict. This is done in anticipation of disputes further down the line, when we return to worrying 
about more legal matters like establishing a practicable set of rules. The goal is to see whether there 
are clear delineations between different motivations for government action. It is an attempt to classify 
motives by the way something enters into a national welfare function.  
Before delving in, it may be worth taking a moment on the concept of “natural limitations.” This is 
not a reference to any sort of divinely-ordained categorization. Rather, it is looking for qualitative 
differences in approach. Of course, there is nothing that restricts the WTO membership to one 
category or another as it describes the limitations on countries’ rights to impose trade barriers. But 
subtle, quantitative distinctions usually require explicit delineation in agreements in a way that broad, 
categorical distinctions do not. Thus, if the Dispute Settlement Body is in search of safe havens to find 
consistency in rulings, such havens are more likely to be found at these categorical boundaries.  
The presumption is that there may be a desire to stop short of extreme territoriality. There are two 
broad checks on the potential for capricious trade restrictions – the motive must be one that the WTO 
membership has approved, and the implementation of the measure must meet particular requirements 
(e.g. least trade restrictive).
5
 If governments can act with impunity on any moral indignation of the 
citizenry, and that indignation can have any cause (e.g. educational curricula in Timbuktu), then the 
first of these two checks becomes meaningless.
6
  
We proceed through three different categories. First, preferences over the physical characteristics 
of a product. Second, preferences over the pedigree of a product (how it was made). Third, moral 
sentiments, potentially disconnected from a product altogether. These are not mutually exclusive, but 
represent steadily broader domains of concern. 
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A.2. Preferences over a product 
In the most standard approach to economics, we think of consumers drawing utility from the 
consumption of a good. A diner consumes some swordfish and is happier for it. We can also think of 
disutility in consumption – someone consumes a dose of mercury and is distinctly worse off for it. 
Here, then, we get to an obvious scenario for regulation: if the swordfish contains mercury, this will 
have a direct effect on the consumer’s well-being. If it were immediately obvious to the naked eye 
whether swordfish contained mercury or not, though, there might not be a need for regulation. There 
would presumably be little market for tainted fish. More likely, though, is the possibility that it is 
costly to check the characteristics of the product. Rather than make individual customers check fish 
themselves, a regulator could require and enforce rules that represented public tastes.  
When describing the physical characteristics of products, measurability is at its easiest. One can 
test to see how much mercury is in the swordfish. The ready observability of physical characteristics 
does not render such preferences immune from conflict. While one can observe the physical 
characteristics, there could be disputes over the relevance of those characteristics. A classic example 
would be genetically-modified organisms (GMOs). Their presence can be measured, but what of their 
impact on health? From a trade perspective, under our strong assumption of homogeneity of tastes, it 
should not make much difference. If everyone in a country believes that GMOs pose an unacceptable 
health risk, there will be no market for products containing GMOs.
7
 Thus, even if another country had 
a very different view of the health effects, a non-discriminatory ban on the product would be 
unnecessary. As foreshadowing for looser assumptions in Section II.B, this issue would reemerge as a 
major problem with heterogeneity of preferences, under which one group believed GMOs were risky 
and another thought them safe. As far as measurability is concerned, the bottom line is that the 
physical characteristics could be readily verified, even if the medical implications could not.  
Thus, the simplest argument of the utility function is direct consumption of a product. We can also 
consider indirect consumption of a product, when the consumption undertaken by a fellow countryman 
has positive or negative externalities. Classic examples could include second-hand smoke or garish 
house paint, each of which could provide pleasure to the original consumer but displease a compatriot. 
Such externalities provide a well-established basis for regulation, since individual welfare 
maximization could lead to a suboptimal outcome. Because we are talking about the effects of 
physical characteristics (drifting smoke, visible color), measurability is not much of a problem here. 
One certainly could encounter international disputes in instances in which it appeared that “like” 
products with similar negative effects were being treated differently. This was part of the claim in US-
Cloves, in which it was argued by Indonesia that clove and menthol cigarettes had similar effects, 
while the United States argued that their physical characteristics were distinct.
8
 
We conclude the discussion of physical characteristics with a consideration of the natural 
limitations on the scope of this type of regulation. The regulations would cover the physical 
characteristics of goods sold in the imposing country. As an importer, the country need take no stance 
on how the goods achieved their physical state. So long as the relevant physical characteristics were 
measurable, there would be no reason for concern about how the product came to be that way. We 
note this as a baseline to contrast with broader concerns to come. We also note that, while drawing a 
bright line at observable physical characteristics might be well-grounded in economic tradition, this 
approach has previously been rejected by the AB in Shrimp 21.5. 
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8
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A.3. Preferences over process 
We turn next to considerations about how a product was made. While this category could potentially 
be quite broad, we will intentionally narrow it by directing large swathes toward the preceding and 
following categories. One central issue that will fall in this category is negative production 
externalities. Suppose a product could be made with either a “dirty” or a “clean” technique. The dirty 
technique might release significant pollution, while the clean technique releases none. If this pollution 
occurs within our regulating country, or sufficiently nearby that the country suffers the consequences, 
it can certainly affect the welfare function of individuals within. The government would have the 
sovereign right to regulate any domestic production, but what about the production of goods that 
ultimately end up as imports? The effectiveness of regulation in promoting domestic welfare will now 
depend on a two-stage process – the way regulation affects domestic consumption and the way 
changes in domestic consumption affect the quantity of pollution spillovers.
9
 
In terms of measurability, the challenge here is substantially greater than in the previous section. It 
may be relatively straightforward to measure the extent of pollution flowing across the border from a 
neighboring country, but how much of that pollution is due to production of the product in question? If 
we assume that the output of the dirty and the clean techniques are indistinguishable, then this poses a 
significant difficulty for customs. We could hypothesize two different products differentiated by the 
characteristic “how they were made.”10 Since that characteristic is not physical nor visible at a customs 
entry point, any difference in regulatory approach would either require erroneous approximation or 
cooperation on the part of the exporter. Either one would heighten the possibility of international 
conflict – either unjustified blockage of a product, or potential interference in the domestic practices of 
another country. 
Still, by requiring a measurable negative externality, there are limits to the scope of such concerns. 
For example, while one might be tempted to equate this concern with “processes and production 
methods” (PPM)11, the overlap is imperfect. Organic farming, for example, would not fall in this 
category. While it could well affect the presence of pesticides in food, that concern would properly fall 
in the previous category – the physical characteristic of containing pesticides. The method would only 
serve as an imperfect proxy for the true concern.
12
 Similarly, this would not encompass concerns such 
as those of the EU over an inhumane seal hunt. In that case, there was no allegation that Canadian or 
Norwegian practices inflicted physical harm through negative spillovers. The alleged harm was 
psychic – a moral offense. Thus, those concerns properly belong in the next category.  
A.4. Moral offense 
This section, in contrast to the familiar analysis of the preceding sections, takes on the relatively novel 
question of how to consider moral offense in utility. This is the unchallenged core of the EC-Seals 
case. According to the EC, Europeans found the inhumanity of seal hunting repugnant and immoral. It 
pained them just to know that it occurred. This was not disutility from the consumption of seal 
products such as furs or sealskin boots. Nor was it any environmental spillover from the killing of 
seals, as one might have if they were migratory and played a key role in a European food chain. 
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Instead, the Europeans argued that commercial seal hunts were inevitably inhumane and morally 
offensive.  
There is nothing unusual about members of a community setting standards for right and wrong. 
Traditional concepts of sovereignty provide a natural limitation on the scope of such standards – 
communities can set the rules under which they live. There are also traditions of supra-national efforts 
to establish standards with much broader reach, as with the United Nations, the International Labor 
Organization, or the WTO. In such cases, there is a degree of international consensus about what the 
standards should be.  
The oddity of the claim of moral offense in EC-Seals is that there is very little natural limitation to 
its reach. It reaches across boundaries, but requires no international consensus. The principal test for 
legitimacy of a “public morals” claim under GATT Article XX(a) seemed to be the sincerity of public 
sentiment. Such a test presumably protects against completely spurious claims, such as “My people are 
morally offended by the use of minimills to produce cold-rolled steel!” But there are many plausible 
topics on which public sentiment would likely pass a sincerity test. Maskus (1997)
13
 summarizes a 
debate over the extraterritorial enforcement of labor standards. He describes first the position of Dani 
Rodrik, who advocated “allowing nations to impose ‘social safeguards’ tariffs against countries that 
follow labor practices that can be shown, through a series of filters, to be morally reprehensible to a 
majority of citizens in the importers. His argument is that high-standard countries, such as the United 
States, have expressed in their legislation social preferences against certain domestic production 
technologies, such as child labor use and ‘sweat shops.’ However, allowing free imports with low-
standard countries is, in his view, simply an additional technology that is equivalent to importing 
foreign workers and allowing them to work under these unacceptable conditions. Accordingly, 
importing nations should be allowed to prevent access to this technology as well via trade 
restrictions.” Maskus quotes T.N. Srinivasan as critiquing the idea: “acceptance of this proposal would 
pose considerable difficulties for the trading system. Apart from technical difficulties in calculating 
appropriate social tariffs, its logic would open the WTO to trade sanctions imposed by countries for 
any purpose related to cost-raising domestic regulations. Countries constrain or prohibit numerous 
types of processes for environmental, health, aesthetic, and other reasons. Under Rodrik’s approach, 
any such differences in domestic and foreign production regulations potentially could invite tariffs to 
offset resulting cost variations.” 
Note that Srinivasan’s argument, as quoted, presumes a limitation that need not exist in the public 
morals setting. He imagines that there must at least be a linkage between foreign practice and domestic 
costs. With public morals, there need be no such linkage. The public could be offended by 
multinationals linked to imperialism, or countries with objectionable human rights record. All that 
seems required is a sincere belief that the act is offensive and commerce would, directly or indirectly, 
support the act.  
In his consideration of the GATT public morals clause, Charnovitz (1997, p. 21) finds relatively 
few limitations. He writes, “The danger of protectionist abuse is real. Virtually anything can be 
characterized as a moral issue. At this point, however, it seems premature to worry about overuse of 
article XX(a). One can imagine nations justifying many import bans as morally-based. Throughout the 
50 years of the GATT-WTO system, however, no member state has challenged a morally-based 
import ban.” That last consolation, of course, no longer applies. In his invocation of protectionist 
danger, Charnovitz raises the specter of mixed motives, which we have deferred to the following 
section.  
The point here is the potential breadth of moral claims. The potential for extraterritoriality and 
overreach has drawn dramatic speculative examples from other authors, particularly in the analyses of 
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the Gambling decision, which relied on the analogous GATS Article XIV(a). Marwell (2006) 
attributes the growing challenge of limiting public morals cases under the GATT to the burgeoning 
membership of the organization: 
Amongst 148 WTO Member States, "public morals" could mean anything from religious views on 
drinking alcohol or eating certain foods to cultural attitudes toward pornography, free expression, 
human rights, labor norms, women's rights, or general cultural judgments about education or social 
welfare. What one society defines as public morals may have little relevance for another, at least 
outside a certain core of religious or cultural traditions.
14
  
Wu (2008), in his analysis of Gambling, provides a trichotomy of potential public morals 
measures:  
Type I restrictions are those used to directly safeguard the morals of inhabitants within one’s own 
country. The U.S. ban on internet gambling would fall into this category, as would bans on 
pornography, narcotics, or alcohol. Type II restrictions are those linked to the protection of those 
directly involved in the production of the product or service in the exporting state. For example, a 
ban on products made by child labor would fall within this category, as would a ban on services 
for sex tourism. Type III restrictions are those aimed at products or services produced in an 
exporting state whose practices are considered morally offensive by the importing state, but where 
the practices are not directly involved in the production of the products or service being banned. 
An example would be an outright ban on imports from Sudan because of its government’s human 
rights violations in Darfur.
15
 
Wu goes on to recommend that a natural limitation on morals measures would be to limit countries to 
Type I restrictions. This typology matches only imperfectly with one based on an economic welfare 
approach. In the Type I examples given in the quoted paragraph – gambling, pornography, narcotics or 
alcohol – we think of the harm as deriving from either an individual’s consumption or the negative 
spillovers of the consumption of others in the community. Such a narrow reading of Type I moral 
concerns would effectively take us back to the types of welfare analysis described before this section. 
In Wu’s typology, seal hunting should properly fall within Type II. However, the EU claim, if taken 
seriously, is that EU consumers suffer moral harm from purchasing the products of seal hunts. If the 
moral harm is psychic in this way, rather than through consumption, and if states have the right to try 
to alleviate this harm, then it is hard to see why it matters whether the sincere moral offense stems 
from a production process or from dealing with an individual, company, or country that the morally 
sensitive inhabitants of the importing country find objectionable.  
This moral category of welfare claim poses commensurate challenges when it comes to 
measurability. Though a trade measure would necessarily apply to a good or service imported from 
another country, there need be no observable characteristic of that product to reveal whether it should 
be subject to the measure. Nor would there need to be any observable transboundary flows of pollution 
or other diminished migration.  
In fact, the measurability problem runs even deeper. One of the questions raised in the Seals case 
was whether the EC Seal Regime served to ameliorate the problem. If the “problem” were the 
Canadian or Norwegian seal hunts, then evidence of the sort presented in the Panel decision (7.457) 
should suffice. But the Seals case is emphatically not about animal welfare, which would be covered 
under GATT Article XX(b). The Panel writes: “Based on the examination of the measure at issue as 
well as other available evidence before us, we determined that the objective of the EC Seal Regime 
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was to address the EC public moral concerns on seal welfare.
16
 We further found this objective to fall 
within the scope of the policy objective governed by Article XX(a).” (7.640).  
The extent of public moral concern is substantially more difficult to measure. Nor is it obvious that 
such a psychological measure would vary (strongly) monotonically with more observable measures, 
such as the number of seals hunted. If we fielded a survey across the EC, for example, which asked the 
public how upset they were about seal hunting on a scale of 1 to 10, we might well get the same level 
of moral concern in a year in which 400,000 seals were killed as in a year in which 100,000 seals were 
killed. There would be nothing irrational or ignorant about such a finding; an EU citizen could feel 
strong outrage if even one seal were killed and need not reserve additional levels of outrage for higher 
death tolls. Technically, though, this demonstrates both that the problem (moral concern) is 
exceedingly difficult to measure, and that actions to diminish the subject of concern need not diminish 
the moral concern itself.  
A.5. Attempts at limitations 
Does the breadth of a moral concerns approach to welfare mean that one should forsake it altogether 
and that it should be impossible to restrict trade based on the characteristics of the production process? 
No. There can be processes that everyone agrees are offensive (e.g. slave labor). If the objections are 
universal, then there should be no difficulty agreeing to embody them in explicit exemptions.
17
 Both 
Marwell (2006) and Wu (2008) explore potential limitations based on the extent of global support for 
a moral standard. There are a number of difficulties, however. Wu notes that geopolitical measures 
against Taiwan or Israel frequently garner sufficient support to clear any standard majoritarian 
hurdle.
18
 From a systemic standpoint, if the moral standards themselves are not accepted by all WTO 
members, then anything short of unanimity would represent a de facto move to a new majority voting 
standard. Extensive experience at international organizations such as the United Nations or the 
International Monetary Fund demonstrates that countries care deeply about the weights and 
requirements in any such scheme.
19
 Obviously, in a contested dispute such as Seals, there is no 
consensus about the moral standard in question.  
If, on the other hand, there were a consensus on a particular measure, it would have two ready 
routes to adoption. First, there would be no member to challenge the measure. Second, the measure 
could be adopted explicitly by the membership as part of any package that might be adopted.  
B. The Screening Problem and Consistency 
In the preceding section, we maintained the assumption that the country acting to protect the morals of 
its citizenry had motives that were pure. Virtually every commentator cited, however, notes the 
potential for an overly broad morals clause to be used as justification for protection. This concern is 
described in the chapeau of Article XX, which warns against “disguised restriction on international 
trade,” thereby suggesting the possibility of nefarious motives. The implication is that there is likely to 
be a heterogeneity of interests within the importing country’s population (some may be offended by a 
measure; some may not) and there may be a multiplicity of motives among the country’s leaders.  
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 Wu (2008, p. 241).  
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B.1. The consistency check of the Panel and AB 
This multiplicity of motives ended up playing a critical role in the Seals decisions. Howse, Langille 
and Sykes (2014) argue that the EU should be able to address the AB’s concerns with ease, on the 
grounds that the EU could have successfully defended its Seals Regime had its motives been pure. The 
EU ran into trouble with both the Panel and the AB when it allowed exceptions for the hunts of 
Indigenous Communities (IC), Marine Resource Management (MRM) and Transportation 
(importation of seals or seal products for re-export). The opining jurists seemed to question the 
sincerity of EU motives. If it is morally offensive to consume the products of a seal hunt, how can that 
moral offense disappear if the hunt is conducted by an IC member?
20
 Given the potential breadth of a 
“moral concerns’ exception described above, the sincerity of moral concerns understandably played a 
significant role.
21
 
Howse, Langille and Sykes (2014) argue that this requirement for pure motives is unrealistic in a 
world with a range of competing interests: 
“A requirement of consistency would be unworkable in the real world of policymaking, where 
different considerations and priorities have to be balanced against one another, and the ideal of 
treating like moral challenges alike can never be perfectly achieved. The proposed approach would 
also have dramatically expanded the WTO’s powers of legislative review, contrary to the WTO’s 
institutional mandate.” 
The difficulty with their proposed deference to national political outcomes is that it would render it 
virtually impossible to question even the sincerity of a moral concerns claim. Other than an explicit 
public survey in which there was a resounding “we don’t care!” response on the subject in question, 
almost any inference from the nature of the regime could be deflected with the argument that it was a 
concession to necessary political compromise.
22
 This only works if we grant the erectors of trade 
barriers free rein by assuming that motives are pure.  
B.2. Troublesome motives and separating equilibria 
Let us postulate, for the moment, that there are at least two “types” that might back a regime 
restricting seals imports: those with permissible motives (e.g. moral concerns) and those with 
impermissible motives (e.g. protectionist concerns). One obviously cannot distinguish the two types 
just by asking (any self-respecting protectionist would claim pure motives).  
This challenge is a familiar one for economics.
 23
 There are plenty of examples when one wishes to 
distinguish two types on the basis of unobserved characteristics. For example, employers might want 
to distinguish between dedicated and flighty workers. Insurance companies might want to distinguish 
between careful and careless drivers. There is even, arguably, a GATT example – the attempt to 
distinguish between a pair of countries with a sincere desire to pursue closer economic relations and 
pairings that just want to undermine MFN.  
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 The decisions spend ample time establishing that there is no real expectation that IC or MRM seal hunts would be more 
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 It is interesting to note that the EU public apparently has difficulty striking a balance between the different moral 
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In each case, the solution is to adopt requirements that lead to a separating equilibrium, in which 
one group will be willing to meet the requirements and another group will not. For employers, they 
can require a college degree. For insurers, they may require a high deductible. In the GATT context, 
Article XXIV requires that FTAs cover substantially all trade and be concluded in a reasonable period 
of time. 
The important point to note is that separating equilibria are not tailored to maximize welfare; they 
are tailored to play off preferences in such a way that different types reveal themselves. In fact, if an 
approach is acceptable to both types, then it is a pooling equilibrium, not a separating equilibrium.  
In the Seals case, one interpretation of the Panel’s qualms about multiple motives is that the panel 
was trying to establish a high threshold for the necessary intensity of moral concern. By disallowing 
balanced political compromises, the Panel meant to discern whether the EC’s demonstrated 
preferences were intense or casual.  
C. Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation  
A final economic perspective concerns the systemic effects of the Seals decision. The scholarship and 
commentary on Article XX(a), along with the key decisions of Gambling and Seals reveal two 
important characteristics:  
1. Ample ex ante uncertainty about the range of permissible actions under the clause. (Some of 
which persists in the wake of the Panel and AB decisions).  
2. A very broad range of potential economic outcomes. (Illustrated by the difficulty in 
establishing limits in Section II.A).  
For the purposes of this section, let us distill the trade world down to two countries: Complainant (a 
Canadian/Norwegian amalgam) and Respondent (representing the EC). We imagine that Complainant 
and Respondent initially sign a trade agreement in which each offers market access concessions to the 
other. The deal is struck when each country assesses that the combination of concessions is preferable 
to the status quo ante. If the two countries were able to foresee all potential contingencies and were 
equipped with inexhaustible lawyers, they could create a complete contract that would clearly cover 
any event to come. Far more likely, however, is that a lack of foresight or legal resources would 
require an incomplete contract. Such a contract would use vague phrases such as “moral concerns” 
rather than providing a precise definition of what exactly this covers. At the decision stage, when each 
country is trying to decide whether to sign the contract (trade agreement), they must base their 
assessments on their interpretations and expectations about what such vague phrases will mean in 
practice.
24
 
In this setting, we will treat the Seals case as one that establishes a clear path for the Respondent to 
restrict Complainant’s access in the seal market. We will further assume that the restriction came as a 
surprise – Article XX(a) emerged as more potent than Complainant had expected.  
Under these assumptions, what is the implication of the decision for the state of trade relations 
between the two countries, present and future? We conclude our analysis with a number of scenarios: 
1. If we interpret Seals as an unexpected restriction on Complainant’s market access, we can first 
consider the possibility that the change is symmetric. If Complainant can identify moral concerns 
within its populace that justify equivalent restrictions on Respondent’s market access, we will end 
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up in a setting very much like a dispute with retaliation imposed. The balance of concessions will 
be preserved, but market access will be less generous. 
2. If Complainant cannot plausibly identify equivalent moral concerns, then the balance of 
concessions will be upset. Now, from a political perspective, Respondent will see the reinterpreted 
agreement as more appealing while Complainant will see it as less appealing. Presumably, at some 
point, an imbalance could cause Complainant to consider whether the agreement was worthwhile. 
3. The situation gets more interesting if we think of the Complainant-Respondent agreement as 
evolving through repeated negotiations, rather than as a single-shot accord. In this case, we can 
draw on the lessons of Kydland and Prescott’s seminal 1977 work on time inconsistency.25 If 
Complainant now expects to have Respondent limit promised market access in future periods, 
Complainant will limit the concessions it makes at the time of agreement. Typically, the result is 
that the potential for negative surprises (discretion) can result in an inferior equilibrium to a 
precommitment to a set of rules (in this case corresponding to the expectations of a narrower 
interpretation of Article XX(a).  
4. A more difficult situation to analyze occurs if we consider repeated interactions in which 
Complainant can use the broader interpretation of Article XX(a) to rebalance concessions with 
Respondent. In this case, we can think of the broadening of interpretation as increasing the 
variability of outcomes (risk) associated with any particular clause of an agreement. As with 
investment risk, this increased variability can result in outcomes that are considered significantly 
more positive or significantly more negative. A question for future political economy research is 
how the higher variability would affect the willingness of Complainant and Respondent to strike 
deals.  
III. Legal Analysis 
In this section we discuss the TBT issues in both the Panel and Appellate Body reports. As we 
explained in the Introduction, the EU seal products regime bans the import and marketing of seal 
products. The ban covers both pure seal products (such as skins or pure seal oil) and products 
containing seal (such as seal fur coats, or food supplements combining seal oil and other ingredients). 
There are three exceptions to the ban, the IC (indigenous communities) exception, the MRM (marine 
resources management) exception, and the Travelers’ exception. The Travelers’ exception was not 
challenged. As between the IC exception and the MRM exception, the IC exception is much more 
important; it gets much more attention; and all the important legal issues are raised in connection with 
it. So I shall discuss only the IC exception, often writing, for convenience, as if it were the only one. It 
is worth noting here, for those who worry that tribunals will be too generous in allowing moral 
purposes, that while the Panel found the IC exception had a legitimate purpose that was not 
evenhandedly applied, it rejected the MRM purpose outright (and the EU did not bother to appeal this 
rejection). 
The seal products regime consisted of a basic regulation, adopted by the European Parliament and 
Council on September 16, 2009,
26
 and implementing regulations for the exceptions, adopted by the 
Commission on August 10, 2010.
27
 By general agreement, the basic regulation and implementing 
regulations were treated as a single measure. Limiting ourselves to the TBT challenges, Canada 
challenged the measure under TBT 2.1, 2.2, 5.1.2, and 5.2.1. Norway challenged the measure under 
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TBT 2.2, 5.1.2, and 5.2.1. The Panel found that the measure was a technical regulation, and that it 
violated TBT 2.1 and 5.1.2, first sentence. It found no violation of TBT 2.2, nor of 5.1.2, second 
sentence, nor of 5.2.1. The Appellate Body’s only finding under the TBT was that the measure was not 
shown to be a technical regulation.  
A. Whether the EU Seal Products Regime is a “Technical Regulation” 
The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos28 set out three requirements for a measure to be a technical 
regulation, and hence subject to the provisions of TBT Article 2. The measure must apply to 
identifiable products; it must, in the words of TBT Annex 1.1 “lay down product characteristics or 
their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions” (or 
else it must be about labeling and identification); and compliance with the measure must be 
mandatory. There was no controversy in EC – Seal Products about whether the measure applied to 
identifiable products, nor about whether it was mandatory. So we shall limit our attention to the 
requirement that the measure “lay down product characteristics or their related processes and 
production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions” (or be about labeling), which 
we shall frequently refer to just as the requirement that it “lay down product characteristics”, 
remembering that that implicitly includes references to “their related PPM’s”, “applicable 
administrative provisions”, and labeling and identification. 
1. The Panel’s Analysis 
The Panel finds that the EU seal products regime does “lay down [a] product characteristic”, and 
hence is a technical regulation. Their discussion is brief, and not a model of organizational clarity. The 
Panel begins its analysis by rehearsing two points from Asbestos. First, they say: “The Appellate Body 
defined the term ‘characteristics’ in EC – Asbestos as ‘any objectively definable “features”, 
“qualities”, “attributes”, or other “distinguishing mark” of a product’. Such ‘characteristics’ include 
not only features and qualities that are intrinsic to the product itself, but also related characteristics, 
‘such as the means of identification, the presentation and the appearance of a product’.” (¶7.103, 
quoting Asbestos ¶67) Then they continue immediately with: “In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body 
found that the prohibition on asbestos fibres as such did not, in itself, lay down any ‘characteristics’ 
because it simply banned asbestos fibres in their natural state. The prohibition on asbestos-containing 
products, however, was found to lay down a product characteristic in the negative form by requiring 
that all products must not contain asbestos.” (¶7.104, quoting Asbestos ¶71) 
After summarizing very briefly the EU regulations, the Panel says that, in light of Asbestos, the 
prohibition on seal-containing products lays down a product characteristic (namely, not containing 
seal.) (¶7.106) They say in a footnote that their conclusion “is not affected by the fact that the 
prohibition of seals ‘in their natural state’ might not, in itself, prescribe or impose any 
‘characteristics’.” (n.153 to ¶7.106) But they never say unambiguously whether they see the EU 
measure a having a part that does not lay down a product characteristic, namely the ban on pure seal 
products (such as seal skins and pure seal oil). Instead, they jump to a discussion of “applicable 
administrative provisions”, namely the administrative provisions for enforcing the exceptions. They 
implicitly recognize that the relevant administrative provisions must be about product characteristics 
(or their related PPM’s),29 and by this route they back into a discussion of whether the exceptions lay 
down product characteristics. They decide that the exceptions do lay down product characteristics; and 
on that basis, they decide that the measure as a whole is a technical regulation.  
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The Panel finds that the exceptions lay down product characteristics because they specify 
“objectively definable features”, (¶7.110) a phrase they had quoted previously from the Asbestos 
Appellate Body. But what the Appellate Body said in full (and the Panel had quoted) was that 
“characteristics” included “objectively definable ‘features’, ‘qualities’, ‘attributes’, or other 
‘distinguishing mark’ of a product”. The full list here suggests a concern with intrinsic or near-
intrinsic properties. This impression is greatly strengthened by the next sentence of the Asbestos 
report, which the Panel did not quote. This sentence says that, “Such ‘characteristics’ might relate, 
inter alia, to a product's composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, 
flammability, conductivity, density, or viscosity.” (Asbestos ¶67) This is a list of intrinsic, or near-
intrinsic, properties of the product – and not incidentally, properties related to the product’s usefulness 
for particular purposes. All of them are a far cry from the “feature” the Panel finds is a product 
characteristic, namely “having been killed by an Inuit”. To be sure, the Asbestos Appellate Body also 
said, as the Panel quoted above, that “product characteristics” are not limited to intrinsic features of 
the product itself, but include “related ‘characteristics’, such as the means of identification, the 
presentation and the appearance of a product.” But this reference to labeling and means of 
identification does not seem like an invitation to regard all non-intrinsic properties of a product as 
“product characteristics”.  
In the Panel’s defense, we have got to a somewhat surprising place in TBT jurisprudence. Are the 
regulations in US – Tuna II (Mexico)30 and US – COOL31, which are about labeling, really so different 
in substance from the EU seal regime? Like the seal regime, the regulations in Tuna II and COOL 
concern themselves with the history of the product, rather than with features or qualities we would 
think of as intrinsic to the products themselves. And yet both sets of regulations were 
uncontroversially regarded as “laying down product characteristics”, just because they involved 
labeling. What is the magic of labeling, that makes any regulation about labeling a technical 
regulation? The Appellate Body could well have read the references to “terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements” in TBT Annex 1.1 as being about “technical” aspects 
of labeling – for example, definitions of terms such as “net weight” and “dry weight”, or a requirement 
that various product specifications be stated in particular units, or requirements on language or font 
size for the presentation of certain content, and so on. But after Tuna II and COOL, it seems that any 
regulation on labeling is going to qualify as a technical regulation. I am not sure this is the best reading 
of Annex 1.1, but even so, there is a kind of sense to be made of it. We can suggest with some 
plausibility that aspects of labeling and packaging are “product characteristics” that are intrinsic to the 
product as it is presented to the purchaser. When I walk into a grocery store, or a hardware store, I am 
not confronted with bare tuna-fish, or piles of bolts, or whatever. I am confronted with labeled cans of 
tuna-fish; or with packages of bolts; or even if it’s a barrel of bolts that I can scoop some out of, there 
will normally be a sign to identify what type and size they are. So, even if the packaging and labeling 
are not features intrinsic to tuna-fish in the abstract, they are features intrinsic to the product that I buy. 
Whatever our view about labeling regulations as technical regulations, the EU seals regime was not 
about labeling, and “having been killed by an Inuit” is not plausibly regarded as a “product 
characteristic” in the sense of TBT Annex 1.1.32 Another argument against the Panel’s analysis is that 
it makes the reference in the first sentence of TBT Annex 1.1 to “product characteristics or their 
related processes and production methods” pleonastic. On the Panel’s approach, according to which 
“having been killed by an Inuit” is a product characteristic, it would seem that any PPM lays down a 
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product characteristic; so once we have mentioned product characteristics in the definition of technical 
regulations, there is no need to say anything further about PPM’s. Nor can we understand this as a case 
of precautionary redundancy. If that had been the drafters’ intention, they presumably would have said 
“product characteristics, including their related processes and production methods” instead of “product 
characteristics or their related processes and production methods” (emphasis added). It is particularly 
ironic that the Panel’s approach would turn all PPM’s into product characteristics, in view of the fact 
that the Panel later claims to have been able to avoid deciding any issue about PPM’s. (¶7.112) 
2. The Appellate Body’s Analysis 
The Appellate Body disposes very brusquely of the suggestion that “having been killed by an Inuit” is 
a product characteristic. They write: “We see no basis in the text of Annex 1.1, or in prior Appellate 
Body reports, to suggest that the identity of the hunter, the type of hunt, or the purpose of the hunt 
could be viewed as product characteristics.” (¶5.45) (They also remark in a footnote that TBT 2.9 
presupposes that technical regulations have “technical content”, which they suggest does not include 
the identity of the hunter or the purpose of the hunt.) (¶5.45, n.942) But of course, deciding that 
“having been killed by an Inuit” is not a product characteristic does not end the Appellate Body’s 
consideration of the case. They appear to endorse the Panel’s Asbestos-based suggestion that a simple 
ban on pure seal products would not lay down a product characteristic, while a simple ban on seal-
containing products would. So how do they decide that the actual regime, which bans both pure seal 
products and seal-containing products, is not a technical regulation?
33
 The Appellate Body emphasizes 
both that the tribunal must consider the measure “as a whole” and that the tribunal must try to identify 
the “integral and essential” aspects of the measure. (¶5.19) These ideas, seemingly in some tension, 
suggest two distinct approaches, and it is not entirely clear which the Appellate Body most relies on.  
The first approach involves “nose-counting”. Insofar as it relies on this approach, the Appellate 
Body first identifies three salient aspects of the regime: (1) it bans pure seal products; (2) it bans seal-
containing products; (3) it has an exception for products (pure seal or seal-containing) that result from 
Inuit hunts. The Appellate Body then observes that with regard to the question whether the regime is a 
technical regulation, (1) the regime’s banning pure seal products counts against its being a technical 
regulation; (2) the regime’s banning seal-containing products counts in favor of its being a technical 
regulation; and (3) the fact that the exception does not lay down a product characteristic counts against 
the regime’s being a technical regulation. So the score is two-to-one against, and the regime is not a 
technical regulation. (¶¶ 5.30, 5.58 first part)  
The Appellate Body’s second approach involves identifying the most “integral and essential 
aspect” of the measure, which in the Appellate Body’s view is the exception. (¶5.41) Focusing on this 
most “integral and essential aspect”, the Appellate Body concludes that the measure is not a technical 
regulation, because the exception does not lay down a product characteristic. (¶5.58 second part) But 
in general, trying to identify the most “integral and essential aspect” of a complicated regulatory 
scheme is a senseless task. Illustrating that point, the Appellate Body’s identification of the exception 
as the most “integral and essential” aspect in this case seems bizarre. The Appellate Body says the 
“prohibition on the products containing seal [i.e., the ban] seems to be derivative of the . . . permissive 
component of the measure [the exceptions].” (¶5.41) But how can the ban be “derivative” of the 
exceptions, when its purpose, which is preventing moral outrage at seal suffering, is completely 
distinct from the purpose of the exceptions, which is allowing the preservation of Inuit culture, and so 
on? Surely it is clear that the EU first conceived of the ban, and only then realized that it wanted the IC 
exception (and the others).  
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There are cases where it does seem plausible to think of the ban as derivative. For example, the 
stadium owner who excludes people from the baseball game unless they buy a ticket. There is no 
independent purpose for the ban on entry; the owner is not trying to minimize the number of people in 
the stadium. It’s just that excluding people who don’t have a ticket is the only way to get people to buy 
tickets. In this example, there is only one purpose, getting ticket revenue; and the function of the ban is 
simply to provide an incentive for people to buy tickets (that is, to bring themselves within the 
exception). So the ban does indeed seem derivative. Conversely, there are cases where the exception 
may seem derivative, for example, the final US shrimp-turtle regulation, which (simplified) says that 
no shrimp harvested without US-style turtle-excluder devices [TED’s] can enter the US market, except 
shrimp from places where there are no turtles. Here the only purpose is protecting turtles, and the ban 
is what achieves that purpose. The exception is for cases where the purpose simply is not implicated. 
But the Seals case is not like either the ball-park case or the shrimp-turtle case. In Seals, there are two 
distinct purposes, which sometimes conflict; people cannot act to bring themselves within the 
exception; and the purpose of the ban is fully implicated even in the cases where the exception is 
made. In truth, Seals represents the only sort of case where it is entirely natural to talk about a “ban” 
and an “exception”. There is something forced about describing either of the other cases that way. But 
enough. I hope we have said enough to establish the oddity of saying the ban is “derivative” in Seals, 
and to suggest the fruitlessness of asking, in complex cases, what aspect of the regulation is most 
“integral and essential”. 34 
In the end, neither the nose-counting-over-all-aspects approach, nor the approach of deciding by 
reference to the most “integral and essential” aspect, seems to make much sense. Consider what 
happens if we try to apply these approaches to an even simpler case. Imagine that the EU seals regime 
consisted only of the ban, on both pure seal products and seal-containing products, with no exceptions. 
Would this be a technical regulation or not? On the nose-counting approach as applied by the 
Appellate Body, the score over distinct aspects is a one-to-one tie. We might break the tie by saying it 
is the complaining Member’s burden to show the measure is a technical regulation; so in case of a tie, 
the regulation is not a technical regulation. But this “burden of proof” approach does not seem 
apposite when the issue is the purely legal issue of whether a measure is a technical regulation, where 
no relevant facts about how the measure operates are in dispute. If instead we adopt the “most integral 
and essential aspect” approach, how do we decide whether it is the ban on pure seal products or the 
ban on seal-containing products that is dominant? The only apparent test would be the quantity (or 
value, or some such) of commerce in each category; but then the measure would be a technical 
regulation or not, depending on whether the commerce in seal-containing products was just more or 
just less than half the total. 
There is another possible approach, overlooked by both the Panel and the Appellate Body, that 
might seem more sensible. We could distinguish between the measure as applied to pure seal 
products, and the measure as applied to seal-containing products. If there are doubts about the textual 
basis for such an “as applied to . . .” distinction, we could follow the lead of the Panel in EC – Biotech 
Products (“GMOs”), in their discussion of a ban justified by multiple purposes.35 We could say that 
the EC seal products regime actually creates two measures, one applying to pure seal products, and the 
other applying to seal-containing products. But this approach would create paradoxes of its own, and 
we have reached the point where further discussion would be too abstruse.  
The true upshot of all this may be that we need a deeper rethinking of our approach to the TBT. 
Perhaps we should pay more attention to the idea that the TBT is supposed to be about technical 
regulations and standards. As we noted above, when the Asbestos Appellate Body gave examples of 
“product characteristics”, it was a very technical-sounding list (“composition, size, shape, colour, 
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texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity, density, or viscosity”) of intrinsic, or 
near-intrinsic, properties related to the product’s usefulness and appropriateness for particular 
purposes. This case report is not the place for a full discussion of the possibilities for such a rethinking 
of the coverage of the TBT Agreement. But it does not seem too late both to reconsider the Asbestos 
distinction between regulation of asbestos in its natural state and of asbestos-containing products 
(which was arguably dictum in that case, since there was apparently no market in natural fibers), and 
to look for a more “technical” approach to “product characteristics”. In light of US – COOL and US – 
Tuna II, it may be too late to limit the relevant labeling requirements to technical aspects of labeling. 
But the only non-labeling cases before Seals are EC – Asbestos and US – Clove Cigarettes,36 both of 
which seem to involve genuinely technical requirements (no asbestos, no clove flavoring). And in 
Seals, despite the unsatisfactoriness of some of the Appellate Body’s analysis, they do reject the idea 
that “having been killed by an Inuit” is a product characteristic. Their overall conclusion that the 
regime has not been shown to be a technical regulation may reflect the intuition that it just isn’t the 
sort of regulation the TBT was supposed to be about. 
B. Whether the EU Seal Products Regime Violates TBT 2.1 
TBT 2.1 is about discrimination, and the only source of discrimination in Seals is the IC exception. 
(Remember we are ignoring the other exceptions.) The ban itself is non-discriminatory: it does not 
discriminate among seal products, and Canada did not argue that it discriminated against Canadian 
seal products in favor of European fox or mink products. So, the problem under 2.1 is the legality of 
the IC exception. The legality of the ban is an issue for 2.2. 
There is no major innovation in the Panel’s 2.1 analysis, which by and large follows the approach 
laid out in US – Clove Cigarettes. But the Panel does make the structure of the analysis clearer than 
the Appellate Body ever has, in particular, by clarifying whether “evenhandedness” has a distinct role 
in the analysis, or whether it is just another conclusory term like “discrimination.” The Panel lays out a 
blueprint for 2.1 analysis (both the national treatment and most-favored nation aspects) that precisely 
tracks the Appellate Body’s current scheme for analysis under GATT III:4.37 In the Panel’s analysis, 
the question whether the measure is “evenhanded” under TBT 2.1 corresponds to the question whether 
it satisfies the chapeau of GATT XX. 
Let us take it step-by-step. The first question in the Panel’s 2.1 analysis is whether the measure 
involves “like products”. This is precisely the same question under TBT 2.1 as it is under GATT III:4, 
since Clove Cigarettes simply imported into TBT 2.1 the current GATT III:4 definition of “likeness” 
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 WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted 24 April 2012). 
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 I say “the Appellate Body’s current scheme”, because the Appellate Body’s GATT III jurisprudence has been notably 
unstable. In Japan – Alcohol, WTO/DS8 & 10 & 11/AB/R (adopted 1 November 1996), they were understood to say that 
regulatory purpose is irrelevant to the existence of violations under GATT III:2. (§H.2(c)) But in Chile – Alcohol, 
WT/DS87 & 110/AB/R (adopted 12 January 2000), they told us that regulatory purpose was absolutely relevant, (¶62) 
and that Japan – Alcohol had in fact meant precisely that. (¶71) In EC – Asbestos, interpreting GATT III:4, the Appellate 
Body excluded regulatory purpose from the “likeness” inquiry, saying that “likeness” was a matter of competitive 
relationship; (¶99) but they then presented us with a mystery box in their enigmatic ¶100 on “less favorable treatment”. In 
DR – Cigarettes, WT/DS302/AB/R (adopted 19 May 2005), the Appellate Body said explicitly that there was not “less 
favorable treatment” if the disparate impact was explained by factors other than the foreign origin of the products. (¶96) 
Then in US – Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body simply denied that DR – Cigarettes was concerned with whether the 
disparate impact was explained by foreign origin, dismissing one sentence where DR – Cigarettes says that explicitly, 
and ignoring another, but instead quoting a sentence from in between those two sentences, which does not mention 
foreign origin because it is describing what the other explanation is. (Clove Cigarettes, ¶179, n.372) History gives us 
little reason to expect that the Appellate Body’s GATT III:4 jurisprudence five years hence will be what it is now. For the 
full story, and my preferred approach, see Regan, “Regulatory Purpose in GATT Article III, TBT Article 2.1, the 
Subsidies Agreement, and Elsewhere: Hic et Ubique”, in Prevost, Denise and Geert Van Calster, eds., Research 
Handbook on Environment, Health, and the WTO (2012, Edward Elgar), 41-78, at 42-61.  
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in terms of “competitive relationship”.38 The next question the Panel asks is whether there is “less 
favorable treatment” for some foreign products. This question is subdivided into (a) whether there is 
disparate impact on competitive conditions, and (b) whether, if so, the disparate impact “stems 
exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinctions”. Question (a), about disparate impact, corresponds 
to the question whether there is “less favorable treatment” in the Appellate Body’s current approach to 
GATT III:4, since they seem to regard “less favorable treatment” as involving just disparate impact.39 
The Panel’s question (b), about whether the disparate impact stems from legitimate distinctions, is 
further subdivided into (i) whether there is a “legitimate regulatory purpose”, and (ii) whether the 
regulation pursues that purpose “evenhandedly”. Question (i), about legitimate regulatory purpose, 
corresponds to the question whether the measure comes within one of the specific sub-paragraphs of 
GATT XX; and question (ii), about “evenhandedness”, corresponds to the question whether the 
measure satisfies the chapeau of GATT XX.
 40
 (Despite this structural isomorphism, we shall see 
below that the range of possible justifying purposes may be broader under TBT 2.1 than under GATT 
XX; and the burden of proof may not be allocated the same way.) 
In Seals, the issue of whether all seal products were “like” was not controverted. The issue about 
disparate impact on competitive conditions was controverted, but the Panel decided without difficulty 
that there was disparate impact, and this need not detain us. So we are left with the questions whether 
there was a legitimate regulatory purpose, and whether that purpose was implemented evenhandedly.  
1. Legitimate Regulatory Purpose: The Indigenous Culture Purpose (and the Phantasmal “Brazil – 
Tyres Rule”) 
The EU says the purpose of the IC exception is to allow the preservation of Inuit culture. (We shall 
allow the Inuit, the only indigenous communities involve in the present case, to stand in for all 
indigenous communities.) It is striking that the EU apparently does not characterize its concern for 
Inuit culture as a matter of public morals, since they do characterize their concern for seal welfare that 
way (as we discuss in section III.C). Nor does the Panel ever characterize the concern for Inuit culture 
as a matter of public morals.
41
 In fact, the Panel treats the concern for Inuit culture as a legitimate 
purpose, without attempting to bring it under any bit of WTO text at all. The Panel does point to 
international conventions and resolutions that assert the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain their 
cultures. But it carefully says that it uses these international documents only as “factual evidence” that 
“demonstrate[s] the recognized interests of Inuit and indigenous peoples in preserving their traditions 
and cultures.” (¶7.295) Remarkably, Canada does not seem to object (or no more than half-heartedly) 
to the idea that a purpose to allow preservation of Inuit culture can be a legitimate purpose in principle 
under the TBT. That may be because of Canada’s lack of success in arguing against the consumer-
information purpose in US – COOL. Or it may be because Canada has a different sort of objection to 
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 I have suggested elsewhere that importing the GATT III:4 criterion of “likeness” into TBT 2.1 was a mistake. Regan, 
“Regulatory Purpose”, supra note 14, at 61-68. 
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 See, e.g., Seals Appellate Body ¶5.125, and the discussion of Clove Cigarettes in note 14 supra.  
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 Some sub-paragraphs of GATT XX, those stated in terms of “necessity”, require a least-restrictive-alternative analysis, 
while others do not. But even when the sub-paragraph does not require least-restrictive-alternative analysis, the Appellate 
Body has read such a requirement into the chapeau, as in the Shrimp decision that US-style TED’s were not necessary in 
Malaysian shrimping grounds. US – Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted 6 November 1998). So it seems that, one way or 
another, least-restrictive-alternative analysis is always required under GATT XX. It is not entirely clear whether the Seals 
Panel would do this analysis under question (b)(i) or (b)(ii) above, but there is no reason to doubt that they would regard 
failure to use a less restrictive alternative as relevant. (This does not make TBT 2.2 redundant, since 2.2 applies even 
when there is no disparate impact.) 
41
 One could argue that it does so implicitly when it writes, “[W]e did not consider that the evidence before us supports the 
European Union’s position that the EU public attributes a higher moral value to the protection of Inuit interests as 
compared to seal welfare.” (¶7.299) But this is in any case a negative judgment on the idea that the particular resolution 
of the seals/Inuit conflict represents a formed view of the EU public.  
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the EU’s relying on the Inuit culture purpose in this context. (We will return to Canada’s objection in a 
moment.)  
The Panel does not offer any general discussion of what is a “legitimate purpose” under the TBT. 
But the most natural reading of their approach suggests that they regard any sincerely-held purpose as 
legitimate, provided it is not protectionism (in the national treatment context), or does not involve 
favoritism for traders of one country over another (in the most-favored nation context). On this view, 
we are not looking for a positive list of legitimate purposes; rather, we have a much shorter list of 
purposes that are not legitimate. Both in principle and in practice, these are very different approaches. 
And focusing on identifying and restraining illegitimate purposes is more consistent with the general 
spirit of the WTO as a negative integration agreement.  
Notice that focusing on illegitimate purposes under the TBT may mean that a wider range of 
regulatory purposes are acceptable under the TBT than under GATT Article XX. One has to stretch, 
for example, to bring the Inuit culture purpose within GATT XX. Is Inuit culture a “national treasure 
of artistic, historic or archaeological value” under XX(f)? Can we argue under XX(b) that destruction 
of indigenous cultures tends to have negative effects on public health? Or must we rely on the kitchen-
sink interpretation of the “public morals” exception of XX(a)? As long as the Appellate Body is 
committed to not considering regulatory purpose under GATT III:4 or GATT I:1, there will be 
pressure to expand Article XX to cover all purposes that are not illegitimate.
42
 And if we do not 
expand Article XX, the range of permissible purposes under the GATT will be narrower than the 
range under the TBT.
43
 
Now back to Canada’s objection to relying on the Inuit culture purpose to justify the IC exception. 
Canada relies on Brazil – Tyres44 for the proposition that if an exception to a prima facie justified ban 
has a disparate impact, then that exception can only be justified by reference to the same purpose that 
justifies the ban itself. Confronted with this argument, the Seals Panel finds that the IC exception is not 
justified by the public morals purpose that justifies the ban, since the evidence does not establish that 
Inuit hunts are more humane than commercial hunts (indeed, the evidence may suggest that they are 
less humane). (¶7.275) But even though the Panel seems to accept Canada’s assertion of the existence 
of the “Brazil – Tyres rule” against multiple purposes, they decline to apply the rule in this case; and 
they find that the EU can justify the IC exception by the separate purpose of preserving Inuit culture. 
The Panel’s sketchy argument about why this case is different from Brazil – Tyres seems entirely 
conclusory. (¶¶7.296-7.298) Nonetheless, the Panel is right to ignore the “Brazil – Tyres rule”. The 
rule makes no sense; the only argument that is suggested for it in Brazil – Tyres is based on a 
misunderstanding of US – Shrimp; and there is a charitable reading available on which the Brazil –
Tyres Appellate Body did not mean to lay down the rule at all. 
As to why the putative Brazil – Tyres rule makes no sense, reasonable regulators often have 
multiple legitimate purposes, which point in different directions in particular cases. Here the EU wants 
to discourage inhumane seal hunting, and it also wants to allow preservation of the Inuit way of life. In 
the case of Inuit seal hunting, these purposes come into conflict. There is no reason at all to say that 
because it is the former purpose that explains the ban, that purpose must prevail in all cases of conflict. 
A fair-minded regulator could perfectly well conclude that when the purposes conflict, it is more 
important to allow the expression of Inuit culture than to protect seals. We may well think that as the 
regulatory regime responds to more and more purposes, the opportunities for covert protectionism, or 
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for favoritism between trading partners, increase, so we should look for such covert purposeful 
discrimination with special care. But the danger of covert protectionism is not so great, nor so 
unmanageable, that it calls for a flat rule that the regulator must respond to only one purpose, a rule 
that would do enormous violence to sensible decision-making. If both purposes appear to be genuine, 
as they do here, the regulator should be free to decide as it will about cases of conflict, unless there is 
persuasive evidence of misbehavior. 
The only argument the Brazil – Tyres Appellate Body gave for their supposed suggestion that an 
exception must be justified by the same purpose as the underlying ban was an analogy to US – Shrimp. 
They wrote:  
We note, for example, that one of the bases on which the Appellate Body relied in US – Shrimp for 
concluding that the operation of the measure at issue resulted in unjustifiable discrimination was 
that one particular aspect of the application of the measure (the measure implied that, in certain 
circumstances, shrimp caught abroad using methods identical to those employed in the United 
States would be excluded from the United States market) was ‘difficult to reconcile with the 
declared objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles’. Accordingly, we have difficulty 
understanding how discrimination might be viewed as complying with the chapeau of Article XX 
when the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate to the pursuit of or would go against 
the objective that was provisionally found to justify a measure under a paragraph of Article XX.” 
[Citations to Shrimp omitted.] (¶227) 
But the situation in Brazil – Tyres was completely different from the situation in Shrimp. The United 
States in Shrimp did not claim to have multiple purposes (as Brazil did in Brazil – Tyres). The only 
justifying purpose the US offered for any aspect of the measure was the protection of turtles. So, of 
course, if some discriminatory feature of the measure was not justified by that purpose, it was not 
justified; but only because there was no other purpose on offer. In Shrimp, the Appellate Body did not 
reject any proffered purpose on the ground that it was different from the purpose of the ban.
45
  
There is a way to make sense of Brazil – Tyres, which makes the analogy to Shrimp more plausible, 
and which suggests that the Appellate Body in Brazil – Tyres was not really relying on the “Brazil – 
Tyres rule” at all. In Brazil – Tyres, the purpose of the import ban was protection of health, and the 
purpose that was offered to justify the exception for Mercosur countries was complying with a 
Mercosur tribunal’s judgment. Arguably, this was not a legitimate purpose at all in the context of the 
case. For one thing, it is not clear that Brazil actually had an obligation under Mercosur, except by 
virtue of its own incompetence in not relying on Mercosur’s Article XX(b) analogue in the Mercosur 
proceeding against it. (Incompetence, unless it was attempting to create a WTO justification for 
favoring its Mercosur partners.) Even if Brazil did have an obligation under Mercosur, a WTO 
Member cannot simply supersede its WTO obligation, at least not for WTO purposes, by undertaking 
some other conflicting treaty obligation at a later date. (In some circumstances, of course, GATT 
Article XXIV allows precisely this, but the Brazil Appellate Body argued that Article XXIV did not 
save Brazil in this case.) (¶234, n.445) So Brazil’s purpose of satisfying its Mercosur obligation was 
simply not a legitimate purpose at all, in this context; and that is why Brazil could not rely on it.  
The Brazil – Tyres Appellate Body never says flatly that complying with the Mercosur judgment is 
not a legitimate purpose (perhaps because they were bemused by the fact that it obviously is legitimate 
in the abstract). But they do discuss all the reasons we have given for finding the purpose illegitimate 
in this context. Furthermore, whenever they explain specifically why Brazil cannot rely on the 
compliance purpose, they say things like the following: “In our view, the ruling issued by the 
MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal is not an acceptable rationale for the discrimination, because it bears no 
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relationship to the legitimate objective pursued by the Import Ban that falls within the purview of 
Article XX(b), . . ..” (¶228) There is always a reference to Article XX, which suggests that the 
Appellate Body is troubled, not simply by the fact that the compliance purpose is different from the 
health purpose, but more specifically by the fact that the compliance purpose doesn’t seem to fit under 
Article XX, as the health purpose does. If we read the Appellate Body as responding to the reasons for 
regarding the compliance purpose as illegitimate in the context, then Brazil – Tyres says nothing at all 
about how to deal with multiple legitimate purposes, in Seals or any other case.
 
 
The Seals Appellate Body discusses the “Brazil – Tyres rule” briefly, without clearly relying on it. 
They write:  
[T]he European Union has failed to demonstrate, in our view, how the discrimination resulting 
from the manner in which the EU Seal Regime treats IC hunts as compared to ‘commercial’ hunts 
can be reconciled with, or is related to, the policy objective of addressing EU public moral 
concerns regarding seal welfare. In this connection, we note that the European Union has not 
established, for example, why the need to protect the economic and social interests of the Inuit and 
other indigenous peoples necessarily implies that the European Union cannot do anything further 
to ensure that the welfare of seals is addressed in the context of IC hunts [which can also cause 
seal suffering]. (¶5.320; cf. ¶¶5.306, 5.321)  
The first sentence of this sounds like the “Brazil – Tyres rule” pure and simple. That would be 
unfortunate. But the second sentence suggests something subtler: that we might allow the exception to 
be justified by a purpose different from, and even in conflict with, the purpose of the ban, provided 
that the exception is designed in such a way as to minimize the negative effect on the purpose of the 
ban from any specified degree of achievement of the purpose of the exception. That makes better 
sense. (Or at least, it would make better sense in a context where the ban itself required a justifying 
purpose, as it does under TBT 2.2 in the Panel’s analysis, or as it did in Brazil – Tyres, which involved 
an import ban that violated GATT XI:1. But the Seals Appellate Body is deciding the case under 
GATT I:1, so the ban itself, being non-discriminatory, actually required no formal justification. It 
seems odd to judge the exceptions in part by the purpose of the ban, which arguably need never have 
come to the tribunal’s official notice.) 
2. Evenhandedness 
Having decided that the purpose of preserving Inuit culture was legitimate, the Panel faced one final 
question: whether the IC exception implemented this purpose evenhandedly. Note that the exception 
might fail to be evenhanded either (a) with regard to the distinction between the Greenland Inuit and 
Canadian commercial seal-hunters, or (b) with regard to the distinction between the Greenland Inuit 
and Canadian Inuit. The Panel considers a variety of evidence, some of which is relevant to both 
questions, and some of which is relevant only to the second question, without for the most part saying 
explicitly which question it is concerned with. This vagueness leaves it unclear just what violation the 
Panel finds, which means it is also unclear what violation must be corrected to bring the measure into 
compliance. We shouldn’t have to speculate about what the violation is. Tribunals should make it clear 
what aspects of a measure they are finding illegal.  
On the whole, it seems likely that the Panel found the measure un-evenhanded only in the disparate 
treatment of the Greenland and Canadian Inuit, so we will focus on that. Deciding whether the 
measure is evenhanded involves a highly fact-based inquiry, and it is not our goal to say whether the 
Panel was right to find the measure was not evenhanded. But there are things to say about the legal 
structuring of the factual discussion, and on the proper interpretive approach to certain aspects of the 
evidence. The first requisite is to be as specific as we can about what “evenhandedness” requires. The 
Panel sometimes writes as if the measure is un-evenhanded just because of its disparate impact. Thus: 
“This [de facto exclusive access for Greenland Inuit] suggests in our view that the IC exception was 
not designed or applied in an even-handed manner so as to make the benefits of the exception 
available for all potential beneficiaries.” (¶7.317) But disparate impact cannot be enough. After all, the 
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whole point of the general inquiry into “legitimate regulatory justification” is to validate some 
measures with disparate impact. Also, if the Panel really thought disparate impact was all that 
mattered, its discussion of evenhandedness could have been drastically shorter. 
If the issue is not simply disparate impact, it is tempting to suggest the issue must be discriminatory 
purpose. But this would be too quick. In Shrimp, for example, “arbitrary discrimination” was found on 
the basis of procedural inadequacies in the United States’ system for certifying other countries’ turtle-
protection regimes. And one element of “unjustified discrimination” was the refusal to certify 
countries that did not require US-style turtle-excluder devices [TED’s], even when TED’s were not 
necessary for turtle-protection. Neither of these defects of the measure involved objectionable purpose. 
On the other hand, the Seals Panel does not discuss any analogues of these defects in the EU seal 
products regime. So it appears that the issue about evenhandedness in Seals must be about purpose. 
Even if that is right, there is still an important distinction to be made. Some people argue that the 
EU regime cannot have had the purpose of favoring the Greenland Inuit, because they were hurt by the 
regime, albeit less than the Canadian Inuit.
46
 This is a strong argument against the presence of 
discriminatory purpose as we normally conceive it. To illustrate what I mean by “discriminatory 
purpose as we normally conceive it”, consider a protectionist tariff. The purpose of the tariff is 
precisely to discriminate, to put domestic and foreign producers in different positions, and thus to 
improve the fortunes of the domestic producers. And of course, this sort of discriminatory purpose has 
an analogue in the most-favored nation context. But there is no reason to think that the EU seal 
products regime was motivated by discriminatory purpose of this sort. Even aside from the fact that 
the regime harmed the Greenland Inuit, there is no reason to think the goal of the measure was to put 
Greenland and Canadian Inuit in different positions. But even though there was no discriminatory 
purpose in this most traditional sense, there may still have been what we might call “discrimination in 
respect of purpose”. Even if the regulator had no desire to create disparity between the Greenland and 
Canadian Inuit for its own sake, we could still think the regulator was more concerned to spare the 
Greenland Inuit from the full effects of the ban than to spare the Canadian Inuit. Indeed, the claim that 
there was this sort of “discrimination in respect of purpose” is very plausible.  
Even given this discrimination in respect of purpose, there is a further point to consider before we 
can conclude that there was a 2.1 violation. The ultimate question under TBT 2.1 is not whether there 
was discriminatory purpose, or discrimination in respect of purpose, but whether the measure is 
discriminatory. Let us hypothesize that the EU would have struck the balance between the value of 
indigenous culture and the value of seal welfare differently, and there would have been no IC 
exception at all, were it not for Denmark’s championing of the Greenland Inuit. Even on this 
hypothesis, where the existence of the exception depends on special concern for Greenland, it could 
still be that the terms of the exception do not reflect greater concern with market access for the 
Greenland Inuit. This would be perfectly clear if the exception turned out to be de facto available to 
Canadian Inuit as well. But once we grasp the conceptual point that differential concern for certain 
Inuit communities does not necessarily produce a discriminatory exception, we should understand that 
that could be true even though the exception has a disparate impact, if there is a non-discriminatory 
explanation for that differential impact. And arguably there is. Apparently, the reason the Canadian 
Inuit did not take advantage of the IC exception was that the certification scheme requires segregation 
of Inuit and non-Inuit seal products (to make sure commercial seal products are not masquerading as 
Inuit seal products). Such segregation is practicable for Greenland seal products, because the 
Greenland Inuit seal hunt is large enough to support its own processing facility. The Canadian Inuit 
hunts are much smaller, and depend on processing facilities that also process commercially-hunted 
seal, and segregation would be too costly. So the disparate impact of the IC exception seems to be 
explained by the difference in scale of the Greenland and Canadian hunts. The obvious analogue here 
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is the required bond to insure payment of the cigarette tax in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes. 
Honduras objected that because they sold fewer cigarettes in the Dominican Republic than local 
producers did, the flat-rate bond created a greater burden on them, in the form of a higher per-cigarette 
cost. The Appellate Body rejected that argument, in effect saying that a disparate impact that was fully 
explained by a difference in scale was not a GATT III:4 violation. (DR – Cigarettes ¶96) So far, then, 
there does not seem to be a convincing case that the EU seal products regime is un-evenhanded. 
The Panel says darkly that the fact the Greenland Inuit can use the IC exception and the Canadian 
Inuit cannot is “not merely an incidental effect of the application of the measure”. This sounds like 
saying the disparate impact was part of the EU’s purpose. (¶7.315) But all the evidence shows is that 
this disparate impact was not unanticipated. The 2010 COWI Report done for the Commission 
predicted that only the Greenland Inuit would be able to take advantage of the Inuit exception, because 
only they operated on a scale that would make satisfying the certification requirements economically 
feasible. So the EU could anticipate the disparate impact. But that is not the same as being motivated 
to achieve it. Arguably, the EU merely chose the certification scheme that would most reliably prevent 
commercial seal products from masquerading as Inuit products, which was central to their concerns. 
We quoted the Panel above saying: “This [de facto exclusive access for Greenland Inuit] suggests 
in our view that the IC exception was not designed or applied in an even-handed manner so as to make 
the benefits of the exception available for all potential beneficiaries.” (¶7.317) We have explained why 
this cannot mean that disparate impact by itself makes the exception un-evenhanded. But it might 
suggest instead that the EU regime was un-evenhanded because the EU made insufficient efforts to 
facilitate access for the Canadian Inuit. The Appellate Body in Seals, citing Shrimp 21.5,
47
 complains 
specifically that the EU did not exert “comparable effort” on behalf of the Canadian Inuit. (¶5.337) 
But this case is not like Shrimp. In Shrimp, the United States did things for some countries that it did 
not do for the complainants: it negotiated more with them (and concluded one regional agreement); 
and it allowed them a longer phase-in time for the newly required technology. There is no evidence 
that the EU did anything to facilitate access for the Greenland Inuit (aside from Denmark’s premature 
certification of some shipments, which the EU explains as a misunderstanding by Denmark of the new 
regulation). If the Panel thought that the EU should have done more for the Canadian Inuit, they give 
no indication of what they had in mind. Nor does the Appellate Body, beyond “cooperative 
arrangements to facilitate the access of Canadian Inuit to the IC exception”. (¶5.337) The Panel and 
Appellate Body almost suggest that the test of whether the EU has made enough effort is whether the 
Canadian Inuit can sell in the EU. But Shrimp 21.5 made it clear that the requirement of “comparable 
effort” by the regulator does not mean that the complainant country’s goods must be admitted.  
There are unquestionably certain ironies in the effects of the IC exception. The Greenland Inuit 
have access to the EU market, and the Canadian Inuit do not, even though the Greenland hunt is more 
commercialized than the Canadian Inuit hunt. Similarly, the Greenland Inuit have access to the EU 
market, and Canadian commercial hunters do not, even though the Greenland hunt is in some respects 
more inhumane than the commercial hunt. (The Greenland Inuit sometimes use nets to take seals, 
which is probably the most inhumane method of all.) But it should be remembered that even if the 
Greenland hunt is more commercialized than the Canadian Inuit hunt, it is still very different from the 
Canadian commercial hunt. The Greenland Inuit hunters work alone or in pairs; a much greater 
proportion of the seal products are consumed by the hunters or in their community; sealing represents 
a much higher proportion of the hunters’ income; and the hunters have fewer alternative employment 
opportunities. Most importantly, the Greenland hunt is the continuation of a long cultural history, 
which is changing but still historically rooted and distinctive, and which is much more pervasive in the 
lives of the Inuit than seal-hunting is for Canadian commercial hunters. In sum, protecting the 
Greenland Inuit is not protecting a commercial hunt. As to the claim that the Greenland Inuit use more 
inhumane hunting methods than commercial hunters, this is largely or entirely attributable to the fact 
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that the Inuit of necessity hunt all year round, and netting is the only practicable technique in the dark 
months. The harm to seals may be heightened, but so is the connection to the distinctiveness of Inuit 
culture. (Incidentally, it appears that the northern Canadian Inuit also use nets for similar reasons.) So, 
ironies, yes, but only because the world is complicated.  
In sum, the facts relevant to “evenhandedness” are messy. But if we assume that Canada has the 
burden of showing un-evenhandedness, as part of its general burden of proof under 2.1 (remember that 
the Sardines Appellate Body imposed on Peru the burden of showing under TBT 2.4 that the Codex 
standard was effective and appropriate for the EU);
48
 and if we assume that the Panel has produced the 
best evidence available to show that the regulation is un-evenhanded; then I am not sure the Panel got 
the right result. Indeed, the evidence seems sufficiently inconclusive in either direction so that it might 
be that the right answer under TBT 2.1 is that Canada has not shown the measure is un-evenhanded, so 
the EU wins; and the right answer under the GATT XX chapeau is that the EU has not shown the 
measure is in compliance with the chapeau, so Canada wins. The different burdens of proof would 
make the GATT more restrictive than the TBT in national treatment and most-favored nation cases.  
Whatever we think about the right result on the facts, let us quickly summarize the conceptual and 
legal lessons from our discussion: (1) the evenhandedness inquiry is not simply about whether there is 
disparate impact (although there may be cases like Shrimp, involving specific types of disparate 
impact, where there can be un-evenhandedness without any illegitimate purpose); (2) even when there 
is no discriminatory purpose in the classic sense (exemplified by protectionism), there may still be 
what we have called “discrimination in respect of purpose”; (3) the measure may be evenhanded, even 
if its adoption was motivated by a distinctive concern for particular beneficiaries; (4) anticipating a 
disparate impact is not the same as being motivated by it; (5) disparate impact that results from 
differences of scale is not necessarily a violation; and (6) there is no general requirement that the 
regulator take measures sufficient to alleviate disparate impact from an innocently-motivated measure. 
C. Whether the EU Seal Products Regime Violates TBT 2.2 
TBT 2.2 requires that a measure not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
objective. So under 2.2, the Panel was required to decide whether the EU’s ban on seal products had a 
legitimate purpose, and if so, whether the same degree of fulfillment of that purpose could have been 
achieved with less trade restriction.  
1. Legitimate Regulatory Purpose: The Public Morals Purpose (and “Extraterritoriality”)  
The Panel finds that the basic purpose of the EU ban is a public morals purpose, reflecting EU 
citizens’ moral opposition to the inhumane killing of seals, and their desire not to participate in such 
inhumane killing by purchasing products from inhumanely killed seals. And the Panel finds that this is 
a legitimate purpose under the TBT. This is the first time a WTO tribunal has found that “protecting 
public morals” is available as a justification under the TBT, but even so, that hardly seems like a 
ground-breaking conclusion. Given that the list of purposes in TBT 2.2 says it is not exclusive (and 
does not even include all the purposes mentioned in the TBT Preamble); and that the Appellate Body 
in US – Tuna II suggested looking to other WTO agreements for help in identifying legitimate 
purposes;
 (¶313) and that both GATT XX and GATS XIV have “public morals” clauses; it would be 
surprising if the Panel had held that protecting public morals, at least in the abstract, was not a 
legitimate purpose under the TBT. Canada and Norway do not seem to have objected to the idea that 
public morals are a legitimate purpose. 
With regard to how we establish the content of the Member’s “public morals”, it is notable that the 
Panel does not appear to require polling evidence, or surveys, or the like. The evidence in the case did 
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include some unsystematic public-comment evidence, of dubious probative value, collected by a 
consulting firm that studied the seals issue for the European Commission.
49
 But the Panel seems to 
have relied instead on the long history of more dispersed expressions of public concern, through 
NGO’s and the like, and by legislative efforts in the various European countries and the EU itself (on 
related issues such as the killing of seal pups), which repeatedly characterized the issue as a moral or 
ethical one. This is completely appropriate. Especially in a democratic government (and we must 
assume by default for all WTO members), one of the roles of government is to construct and articulate 
public commitments, moral and otherwise (subject to certain limits of course), more concretely and 
distinctly than the population at large has the means to do.
50
 In US - COOL, the Panel was explicit that 
the legislature can establish a public purpose of providing country-of-origin information to consumers, 
without any evidence other than the regulation itself that consumers wanted such information.
51
  
There are features of the EU seal products regime that cause some people to doubt the EU’s 
commitment to avoiding animal suffering. (1) The ban was concerned only with seal products, 
ignoring the killing of farmed fox and mink for fur. But the conditions under which seal are killed are 
very different. (2) The exempted Greenland Inuit hunt was arguably especially inhumane, because it 
allowed netting in some circumstances. But as noted above, this was attributable to the year-round 
nature of a subsistence hunt. (3) Perhaps most troubling, the regime did not prevent the import of seal 
products for auctioning or other processing and re-export. This may be partly explained by the idea 
that prohibiting such “inward processing” would probably not reduce the overall commerce in seal 
products (and hence the harm to seals) to nearly the extent that banning local purchases does. But the 
most persuasive argument for the genuineness of the EU’s moral purpose is just this: Unless we think 
the seal ban was protectionism for fox and mink farmers (an argument the complainants apparently 
thought too weak to rely on), there is simply no reason for the EU to have enacted the ban, even with 
all its limitations and exceptions, other than a concern for seals. 
It is striking that the EU does not defend its seal products regime with the “direct” argument that it 
protects seals, but only (or very predominantly) with the “indirect” argument that it avoids moral 
outrage over seal suffering and participation in immorality by consumption. Presumably the EU was 
worried that protecting seals in Canada or Norway would not qualify as a legitimate purpose under the 
TBT or under GATT XX(b); whereas the moral outrage and the participation-by-consumption, even 
with regard to “foreign” seals, are located safely inside the EU. Relying on the public morals argument 
may have been a prudent litigation strategy, although it is worth remembering that the Appellate Body 
has never established the sort of territorial limitation the EU was presumably worried about. The 
Appellate Body set aside the territoriality issue in US – Shrimp with the observation that the relevant 
sea turtle populations were all of species that migrated through US territorial waters; (¶133) and in US 
– Tuna II, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body found it necessary to discuss territoriality at all 
(although that might have been because the dolphins were on the high seas). 
Canada and Norway’s behavior is harder to understand. If the EU was sufficiently worried about 
territoriality issues to avoid claiming that they were protecting foreign seals, why didn’t Canada and 
Norway positively assert that the EU couldn’t protect seals in their countries, and then follow up with 
the argument that it should not be possible for the EU to evade that territorial limitation by shifting the 
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focus from the seals to EU citizens’ feelings about the seals? Of course, one can respond to a crude 
ipse dixit that, “The EU can’t protect seals in Canada and Norway,” with the equally crude response, 
“The moral feelings are in the EU.” But if there is any serious argument that establishes that the EU 
should not be able to protect foreign seals (not even using only the mechanism of limiting its own 
purchases), then that argument will very probably establish also that the EU should not be able to act 
on its feelings about foreign seals. In that case, the public morals end-run around the territorial 
limitation should not be allowed. 
The crucial question then becomes whether it would be legitimate for the EU to apply its 
consumption ban to Canadian and Norwegian seal products in order to protect Canadian and 
Norwegian seals. I think the answer is yes, it would be legitimate. Why should it not be? It is 
uncontroversial that a regulator may, as matter of fact, have a sincere concern for avoiding suffering 
by its domestic seals; and it is uncontroversial that the regulator may legally act on that concern. But 
any sensible regulator concerned to avoid suffering by its domestic seals would have exactly the same 
concern regarding foreign seals. The fact that the regulator acts to protect foreign seals as well as 
domestic is not by itself reason to think either that the regulation is motivated by national-origin 
preference (which is what TBT 2.1 and GATT I:1 and III:4 are designed to prevent), or that the 
regulation is more trade restrictive than necessary to protect the foreign seals (which is what TBT 2.2 
is designed to prevent). To be sure, if the case were about different treatment of seal products, mostly 
from abroad, and fox or mink products, mostly domestic, then we would want to take a specially 
careful look at the sincerity of the concern for seals, and the reasons for not extending the same 
protection to fox and mink, to make sure there is no national-origin preference at work. But the 
complainants did not make that argument. Similarly, we may sometimes want to take a closer look at 
the regulator’s assumptions about what degree of trade restriction is necessary to prevent harm 
occurring abroad and caused by behavior abroad, just because the regulator may be less well-informed 
about such cases. (Arguably Shrimp on TED’s is an example of this.) But to my mind, none of these 
reasons for a close look justifies a flat ban on concern for foreign animals.  
A different sort of argument is often suggested: that it is up to Canada (for example) to decide how 
Canadian seals shall be treated, and that the EU’s applying its seal products ban to Canadian seal 
products is interfering in Canada’s internal affairs. But the EU is not claiming any power to regulate 
seal-hunting in Canada directly. All it is doing is collectively refusing to purchase goods that it 
collectively does not want. Once we recognize the general right of governments to aggregate the 
preferences of their citizens, and to speak for their citizens on economic matters such as this, this is 
just the way the market works. Consumers, including countries as collective consumers, are not 
expected or required to buy what they do not want. Indeed, to force countries to buy what they do not 
want would be a serious interference in their internal affairs.  
It may seem that my argument here is too strong. Can a Member refuse to buy foreign goods, or 
goods from some other particular Member, just because it doesn’t want to buy foreign goods, or goods 
from that other Member? Of course not. But the reason is not any internal limitation on my argument. 
Countries should properly be free to act in this way, unless they have undertaken a commitment not to. 
But WTO Members have undertaken a general commitment not to engage in national-origin 
discrimination, either protectionism (except by tariffs) or preferences between foreign countries.
52
 A 
nation that wants to engage in protectionism should not join the WTO; a nation that wants to be able to 
discriminate against some particular other Member should take care to exclude WTO legal relations 
with that Member (as WTO Agreement Article XIII allows). Otherwise, each WTO Member has 
                                                     
52
 There are, of course, important exceptions in the most-favored nation context, for preferential trade areas and general 
systems of preferences for developing countries. 
Philip I. Levy and Donald H. Regan 
26 
agreed not to exclude goods from any other Member on national-origin grounds, even if it regards that 
Member as a pariah.
53
  
The question that has brought our discussion to this point is whether the EU can protect foreign 
seals. Protecting foreign seals could be done (indeed, if this were the only goal, it would be done best) 
by a simple ban, with no exceptions. Such a ban would not be a PPM; it would exclude seal products 
on the basis of properties fully ascertainable by inspection at the border. Even so, the issue about 
territorial restrictions on regulators’ purposes bleeds over into the discussion of PPM’s. So let us shift 
our focus for a moment to PPM’s. Many people used to think that WTO membership entailed a 
general commitment not to choose among products on the basis of their production history (where that 
production history left no trace in the physical constitution of the product as it crossed the border). But 
the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp 21.5 established definitively that there is no such general 
commitment. In fact, I think much of the opposition to PPM’s resulted from the fact that the examples 
that people used to talk about were country-based PPM’s involving national-origin discrimination. 
Country-based PPM’s are indeed forbidden, because of the broader commitment not to engage in 
national-origin discrimination that we have already discussed. 
But not all the opposition to PPM’s is directed at country-based PPM’s. Even people who admit the 
permissibility of the US’s revised shrimp-turtle regulation (either because they are persuaded, or 
perforce) raise other, more problematic, examples. The most-popular example is a hypothetical ban by 
a rich country on foreign goods made by workers paid less than the rich country’s domestic minimum 
wage? (Notice this PPM is product-based.) This perennial example is powerful because no one wants 
to allow the minimum-wage PPM. Nor do I. But I also don’t think the specter of the minimum-wage 
PPM is enough to justify prohibiting the US’s shrimp-turtles PPM, or the EU’s (non-PPM) seal 
products ban. The problem is how to distinguish them.  
It is possible that we don’t need a theoretical justification for the distinction at all. There has never 
been an actual minimum-wage PPM, and very likely the fact that such a PPM would be universally 
condemned as illegal, ignorant, and deeply unjust, is enough to deter any Member from enacting one. 
If such a PPM ever were enacted, it would presumably be defended on the ground that it protected 
exploited foreign workers. (To admit that it was designed simply to protect domestic workers against 
the low-wage foreign competition would be to admit protectionism outright.) But in fact, such a PPM 
is virtually certain to hurt the already vulnerable foreign workers it is nominally designed to benefit. 
Which means it is either disguised protectionism, or monumentally stupid. There is no general WTO 
principle forbidding stupidity. With regard to the minimum-wage PPM, however, we might say that 
the stupidity required to explain the PPM innocently is so extreme that the PPM is overwhelmingly 
likely to be protectionist, and hence it should be held illegal. This may be the best way to deal with the 
puzzle.  
Still, there are other possibilities for distinguishing the minimum-wage PPM from the shrimp-turtle 
PPM or the seal products regime. For one thing, the minimum-wage PPM is potentially much broader. 
Even if the minimum-wage PPM as actually adopted applies only to some particular product when 
made with “underpaid” labor, it focuses on an aspect of production (the low wage) that is likely to be 
common to all productive enterprise throughout any affected exporting country. So it threatens to 
function like a country-based measure. That means we might justify a rule against such potentially 
broad PPM’s as an implementation (admittedly crude, as rules often are) of the consent-based 
principle against national-origin discrimination. The potentially broad PPM also represents much more 
of a threat to seriously disturb the agreed balance of concessions. So we might justify a rule against 
such PPM’s as an implementation (again crude, as rules often are) of GATT XXIII:1(b).  
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A different sort of point is that the foreign government is conceived of as speaking for its citizens 
(even though we know real governments often do not speak for all their citizens), in a way that it is not 
conceived of as speaking for its seals, its shrimp, or its turtles. Aside from the fact that seals and other 
fauna do not speak on political matters, a nation’s animals are not even “its” animals in the way that its 
citizens are its citizens. So it may seem more disrespectful of the foreign country’s autonomy to reject 
its view (which, at least by a legal fiction, is its citizens’ view) of how its citizens are to be treated than 
to reject its view of how animals, some of which just happen to be found in its territory, should be 
treated. That is obviously not to say the animals are more important than the citizens; quite the 
reverse.
54
 
I have no space for further discussion of “extra-territoriality” and PPM’s. (The reader may imagine 
a sigh of relief.) Although I have made some suggestions about how to distinguish the seal products 
ban (conceived as protecting foreign seals, not moral sensibilities), and similarly the shrimp-turtle 
PPM, from the minimum-wage PPM, I have no definite view at present about how best to do it. But 
that they should be distinguished, and treated differently by the WTO system, I have no doubt. So no 
damage was done by allowing the EU’s end-run around the territoriality issue, although it should not 
have been necessary. 
2. Less Restrictive Alternative 
Once the Panel has decided that the EU’s public morals purpose is a legitimate purpose, it remains to 
consider whether there is any less trade-restrictive alternative measure that would achieve the EU’s 
purpose to the same degree as the actual measure. In brief, the complainants suggest various schemes 
to certify particular shipments of seal products as the result of humane killing, whereas the EU claims 
that no effective system for monitoring is possible, given the physical conditions under which seal are 
hunted. The Panel’s analysis is very fact-intensive, and it is sophisticated in considering possible 
unintended consequences of various suggested regimes, but it breaks no significant legal ground. In 
the end, the Panel concludes that the complainants have not identified any reasonably available, 
equally effective, less trade-restrictive alternative measure, so there is no 2.2 violation. 
By finding no 2.2 violation, the Panel continued what is now a marked trend. There were 
challenges under TBT 2.2 in US – Clove Cigarettes, US – Tuna II, US – COOL, and Seals, and no 
final finding of a 2.2 violation in any of these cases. In Clove Cigarettes, the Panel found a 2.1 
violation but no 2.2 violation, and Indonesia did not appeal the 2.2 finding. In Tuna II, the most 
striking case, the Panel found a 2.2 violation and no 2.1 violation, and the Appellate Body reversed on 
both counts, finding a 2.1 violation but no 2.2 violation. In COOL, the Panel found a 2.2 violation (as 
well as a 2.1 violation) and was again reversed on the 2.2 violation. And then we have the Seals Panel, 
which finds a 2.1 violation but no 2.2 violation. No wonder.  
D. Whether the EU Seal Products Regime Violates TBT 5.1.2 and 5.2.1 
This is the first report dealing with TBT Article 5 on conformity assessment procedures [CAP’s]. 
There were complaints under 5.1.2, first sentence, which requires that a CAP not constitute an 
“unnecessary obstacle to international trade”; 5.1.2, second sentence, which requires that a CAP not be 
“more strict or be applied more strictly than necessary” to give adequate assurance of conformity; and 
5.2.1, which requires that a CAP be undertaken and completed “as expeditiously as possible”. In 
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general, the Panel (no doubt correctly) regarded these provisions as applying, mutatis mutandis, to 
procedures for accrediting certifying bodies, as well as to the actual process of product certification. 
Under 5.1.2, first sentence, Canada and Norway had two grounds of complaint. By way of factual 
background, the EU ban on shrimp products entered into force on August 20, 2010. The EU at no time 
had a governmental body competent to certify products; and the procedures for accrediting private 
bodies to issue certifications were announced only on August 17, 2010. Accordingly, it was 
impossible in practice for any certifying body to be accredited until some time after the ban became 
effective. So for some period after the ban became effective, it was not possible for even products that 
qualified under the exceptions to enter the EU market. 
The complainants argued first that the EU was required to guarantee that trade in qualifying 
products was possible, so that the EU was required to have some EU agency that could certify 
products, until there were accredited private certifying bodies (or indefinitely, if no private bodies 
applied for, or were granted, certification). The Panel rejected this claim with no more argument than 
the observation that Article 5 allows a system of third-party accreditation, (¶ 7.524) which doesn’t 
seem to fully dispose of the question what happens if no private bodies step up. On the other hand, the 
Panel, again without much argument, held that the EU did create an unnecessary obstacle to trade by 
creating a situation in which there was no possibility of certification by the time the ban took effect. 
(¶7.528) These holdings, both ipse dixit’s, may seem to point in opposite directions, but there is no 
logical inconsistency. The upshot is that the EU is not required to guarantee that trade is possible on 
the date the ban becomes effective, or ever (by creating a government certifying agency); but it must 
not guarantee that trade is not possible on the date the ban becomes effective (by having no procedure 
for private certifying bodies to become accredited in time).  
I am not sure the Panel was right to find that the late publication of the accreditation procedures 
created an “unnecessary obstacle”. In the absence of any explanation for why the EU was so late, it 
surely seems that the EU behaved less than ideally. But it seems doubtful that the impossibility of 
certification when the ban took effect was an “obstacle” to trade. The only “obstacle” to trade was the 
ban itself (and the Panel had found in its 2.2 discussion that this obstacle was not unnecessary).
55
 The 
IC exception removes an obstacle, for some traders; so it seems that failure to have the exception is 
only failure to remove an obstacle, and not an obstacle in itself. Consider some hypotheticals. There 
would be no violation if the EU had simply adopted a ban of seal products, with no thought of any 
exception. There would also be no violation if the EU thereafter decided that it wanted to have an IC 
exception, and added one. But the Panel is saying in effect that because the EU knew before it 
promulgated the ban that it wanted an IC exception, it could not enact the ban (which is fully justified 
by its own public morals purpose) without a functioning IC exception in place. And in the actual case, 
it says that without any discussion of what administrative factors might have accounted for the EU’s 
belated formulation of the certification regime. This seems a curious jump. 
It might seem that my argument here is too strong, that it would mean that failure to have a 
functioning exception could never be an unnecessary obstacle, which seems wrong. But the argument 
does not have that consequence. Consider a different sort of case. Suppose the EU requires that milk 
be safe, and has a CAP for certifying safety. In operative terms, this regime will function as a ban on 
milk, with an exception for milk certified safe. But this is different from the seals case, because here 
the exception is required by the health purpose of the ban. Without the exception for safe milk, the ban 
on milk would be unnecessarily trade-restrictive, by reference to its health purpose. In Seals, however, 
a flat ban of seal products would be fully justified by its morals purpose. The IC exception is justified 
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by a different purpose from the purpose of the ban. Hence it is a matter of legislative grace. In which 
case, it seems it is not an “obstacle” for it not to be available in a timely manner.56  
As to 5.1.2, second sentence, the Panel found that that sentence required it to consider whether the 
chosen CAP, once in force, would be stricter than necessary; and it held there was no violation. The 
very plausible reasoning tracked the Panel’s 2.2 discussion; and so we might add this decision to the 
trend of not finding violations of the 2.2 type. Finally, under 5.2.1, with regard to the question whether 
the process for accrediting certifying bodies, once under way, operated “as expeditiously as possible”, 
the Panel held that it had insufficient evidence to find a violation. In connection with one application 
for accreditation from eleven Swedish county administrative boards, there was an initial exchange in 
which the EU Commission listed deficiencies in the application, and the boards responded with new 
documentation. It then took the Commission over fourteen months to decide this new documentation 
was sufficient, and accredit the boards. The Panel said this did not seem “expeditious”. (¶7.577) But 
they later said that the complainants “have not provided any specific argument as to how the CAP was 
not conducted in the concerned instances as expeditiously as possible”; and so they found no violation. 
(¶7.579, emphasis in original) Perhaps their idea was that one egregious case (the other case they 
discussed was slow, but not so extreme) does not make a violation of a provision aimed at a systematic 
fault. 
E. Coda: Does the TBT Matter? 
In EC – Seal Products, the Panel focused on the TBT violations; its discussion of GATT was parasitic 
on the TBT discussion, and essentially an afterthought. The Appellate Body held that the EU seal 
products regime was not a technical regulation at all . . . and then got the same result under the GATT, 
just as the Panel had. This is an apt occasion to wonder whether the TBT is actually making any 
difference. The two distinctive obligations in TBT Article 2, which is the core of the Agreement, are 
the obligation to use least trade-restrictive regulatory means in 2.2, and the conditional obligation to 
use international standards in 2.4. As we pointed out above, the tribunals have shown a notable 
reluctance to find 2.2 violations. There has been one holding of a violation of 2.4, in EC – Sardines, 
but it seems very likely that the same result could have been reached under TBT 2.1, and under GATT 
III:4. Once the Appellate Body held in Sardines that the burden was on the complainant Member to 
prove that the international standard would be “effective” and “appropriate” for use by the respondent 
Member, they effectively guaranteed that whenever there is a 2.4 violation, there will be a strong case 
for a GATT violation (of III:4, or I:1, as relevant), assuming there is disparate impact. Even if there 
were no 2.4 and no obligation to use the international standard, the international standard would still, 
by hypothesis, describe an effective and appropriate less trade restrictive alternative measure. The 
most distinctive feature of TBT 2.2 and 2.4 is that they do not require disparate impact as part of 
establishing a violation. But so far, the facts of all eight TBT cases (including the cases in which no 
TBT issues were decided other than issues about what was a technical regulation) have involved 
disparate impact.
57
 That is not surprising. It is cases involving disparate impact that complainants are 
most likely to care strongly about, and most likely to be willing to spend resources litigating. What all 
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this means is that the TBT may not matter much in practice. Perhaps, heretical thought, the Members 
should abolish it, to save litigation resources and focus litigation better on the real issues.
58
  
IV. Conclusion 
The EC-Seal Products Panel decision dealt with a variety of specific questions under the TBT. In the 
process, it also dealt more generally with the balance between a nation’s right to regulate in support of 
its citizens’ moral concerns and trading partners’ rights to market access. The Panel did not settle on 
any of the “bright lines” that have been suggested to limit regulation. It is possible to wish that the 
Panel had laid down some bright lines, to give more specific guidance about what regulations will be 
upheld or invalidated in the future, and to provide stronger safeguards against protectionism. Or it is 
possible to think the Panel gave about as clear guidance as is desirable or possible for this sort of case, 
and additional bright lines would unduly restrict governments’ ability to pursue innocent and 
legitimate purposes.  
Whether one welcomes the Panel’s analysis or sees it as alarming depends on how one perceives 
the prevalence of protectionist motives and the sturdiness of other safeguards against protectionism. 
Given the split of opinion and the range of cases in which these questions might arise, we can expect 
the discussion to be prolonged. 
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 It would be an argument for keeping the TBT if the TBT Committee has been a useful institution (a possibility on which I 
express no view). But it is not clear that we actually need the TBT to get any benefits we now get from the TBT 
Committee. 
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